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Abstract. In this paper, we study N -player Colonel Blotto games with incomplete
information about battlefield valuations. Such games arise in job markets, research
and development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. For
M ≥ N + 1 battlefields, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which the resource
allocation to a given battlefield is strictly monotone in the valuation of that battlefield.
We also explore extensions such as heterogeneous budgets, the caseM ≤ N , full-support
type distributions, and network games.
Keywords. Colonel Blotto games · Private information · Bayes-Nash equilibrium ·
Generalized Dirichlet distributions · Networks
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1 Introduction
In a Colonel Blotto game, players simultaneously and independently allocate their en-
dowments of a resource across a set of battlefields. The player that deploys the largest
amount of the resource to a given battlefield scores a win and enjoys a gain in utility
equivalent to her valuation of that battlefield. Thus, a player’s utility corresponds to
the sum of the valuations of all battlefields won by the player. Colonel Blotto games
naturally arise in a large number of applied settings, such as in job markets, research and
development, electoral competition, security analysis, and conflict resolution. Colonel
Blotto games also have been among the first games seriously studied in the theoretical
literature [7, 8, 9]. While the case of complete information is fairly well understood
[21, 20, 25, 26, 18, 29], progress has been more limited in the case of incomplete infor-
mation, with very few exceptions [1, 17, 13, 3, 15].
This paper studies N -player Colonel Blotto games with M battlefields and multi-
dimensional incomplete information regarding battlefield valuations. We assume that
valuation vectors are private information and independently distributed across players.
Only the ex-ante distribution of valuation vectors is common knowledge. Each player
maximizes the expected sum of valuations of battlefields won, where resource budgets
are fixed and homogeneous across players, and where unused resources do not have any
positive value. In the case where the number of battlefields strictly exceeds the number of
players, i.e., for M ≥ N + 1, we identify a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which any player’s
resource allocation to a battlefield is strictly monotone increasing in her valuation of that
battlefield. The construction of equilibria for more than two players relies on a new dis-
tributional assumption. Specifically, we exploit the particular properties of generalized
Dirichlet and Liouville distributions in finite-dimensional vector spaces equipped with a
1
p-norm.
We also explore several extensions. First, we touch upon the case of heterogeneous
budgets. While a complete solution is beyond the scope of the present paper, we find
new classes of Bayes-Nash equilibria. In one example, a player with a substantially larger
budget outbids her opponent on her preferred (M −1) battlefields, while the player with
the smaller budget bids only on a single preferred battlefield. Next, we seek equilibria in
the case excluded by our assumptions so far, i.e., for the caseM ≤ N . We find equilibria
in the “crowded” case where the number of battlefields is suffi ciently small compared
to the number of players. These equilibria, in which all players bid on their preferred
battlefield only, are shown to exist under a fairly flexible assumption on ex-ante type
distributions. Third, we study distributions with full support, which allows us to extend
existing results. Fourth and finally, we discuss network games in which players may be
active only in a subset of all battlefields.
While the Colonel Blotto game has a certain similarity with a single-unit all-pay auc-
tion [30, 12, 5, 6, 16], our analysis draws especially on three prior contributions. Kovenock
and Roberson [17] presented an example with two players and three battlefields. Private
valuations of battlefields are drawn independently from a uniform distribution over a
two-dimensional surface in Euclidean space. Since, in that case, marginal type distribu-
tions are uniform, the budget constraint may be kept by bidding the squared valuation
on each battlefield. It turns out that this strategy constitutes a symmetric Bayes-Nash
equilibrium. Hortala-Vallve [13] solved the case N = M = 2, where bidding exclusively
on one of the highest-valuation battlefields is a weakly dominant strategy. Akyol [3]
noted that rescaling a valuation vector by a positive factor does not affect a player’s best
response set. He offered an extension to any number of battlefields by assuming that
individual battlefield valuations follow a generalized gamma distribution. However, he
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still focused on the case of two players, which may be restrictive, e.g., in a job market
environment. The analysis of the present paper subsumes all results obtained in prior
work. Moreover, we construct equilibria with more than two players, where we use novel
distributional assumptions to deal with the case M ≥ N + 1. Thus, the present pa-
per goes beyond existing work by considering a wider class of examples of multi-player
Colonel Blotto games with incomplete information about valuations.
There are also a number of less closely related papers. In a model with N players
and private information about budgets, Adamo and Matros [1] identified a symmetric
monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. A higher budget allows a player to scale up her
resource allocation, while the share of the resource allocated to individual battlefields
remains constant. This leads to a tractable one-dimensional problem. Powell [23] studied
a signaling game with private information about vulnerability. Next, in a model of
price setting with menu costs for multiproduct firms, Alvarez and Lippi [4] made use
of the marginals of a uniform distribution on a higher-dimensional Euclidean sphere
that represents a vector of price changes. They, however, studied the problem of a
monopolist, i.e., there is no Colonel Blotto game. Tang and Zhang [28] considered
mixed extensions of normal-form games where mixed strategies correspond to points on
a Euclidean sphere. Paarporn et al. [22] assumed one-sided incomplete information in a
Colonel Blotto game with a finite state space. In our discussion of generalized Dirichlet
and Liouville distributions, we follow Hashorva et al. [11] and Song and Gupta [27]. See
also Richter [24] and Ahmadi-Javid and Moeini [2]. Gupta and Richards [10] offer an
insightful historical account of Dirichlet and Liouville distributions.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 presents the main result. Extensions are discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes. An Appendix offers formal detail omitted from the body of the paper.
3
2 The model
2.1 Set-up and notation
There are N ≥ 2 risk-neutral players, denoted by i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, andM ≥ 2 battlefields,
denoted by j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. Each player is endowed with an identical budget of a
perfectly divisible resource. For convenience, we normalize budgets to one. A player’s
resource allocation is a vector
b = (b1, . . . , bM ),
where bj ≥ 0 denotes the amount of the resource allocated to battlefield j. We call a
resource allocation b = (b1, . . . , bM ) feasible if∑M
j=1bj ≤ 1.
Denote by B = BM the set of feasible resource allocations over M battlefields.
Before deciding about the resource allocation, each player privately learns her re-
spective vector of battlefield valuations,
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vM ).
The vector v is commonly known to be drawn, independently across players, from a given
probability measure µ on (the Borel subsets of) RM+ , where R+ = [0,∞). Let V denote
the support of µ. Specific assumptions on µ and V will be imposed in the statements of
the subsequent results.
A strategy is a (measurable) mapping β : V → B. When adhering to strategy β, type
v’s resource allocation is
β(v) = (β1(v), . . . , βM (v)) ∈ B.
Any strategy of an opponent induces a probability measure over feasible resource alloca-
tions. Therefore, given strategies for the (N −1) opponents, type v’s resource allocation
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translates into a vector of winning probabilities, and hence, into an expected payoff for
type v.
The N players simultaneously and independently choose feasible resource allocations.
In each battlefield, the player that allocates the largest amount of the resource wins. In
the case of a tie in battlefield j, each of the players that allocated the largest amount of
the resource to battlefield j wins in that battlefield with equal probability. Each player’s
payoff equals the sum of her valuations of the battlefields won.
A strategy β∗ will be referred to as a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy if,
for any type realization v ∈ V, the resource allocation β∗(v) maximizes the expected
payoff of type v under the assumption that the other (N−1) players individually adhere
to strategy β∗.
2.2 Heuristic discussion of the player’s problem
Suppose that all opponents of Player 1 adhere to strategy β = β(v). Then, the marginal
distribution of bids on each battlefield is identical across players i ∈ {2, . . . , N}. We
denote the distribution function of this common probability distribution by G(bj) =





F (bj)vj , (1)
where, by independence of types across players, the cumulative distribution function of
the highest bid is given as
F (bj) = G(bj)
N−1.
To grasp the nature of the problem, suppose that the solution to problem (1) is interior
and characterized by first-order conditions, and that F is continuously differentiable in
an open neighborhood of the optimal bid bj , for j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, with a strictly declining
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derivative f . Then, the optimal allocation β(v) satisfies
f(βj(v))vj − λ(v) = 0,
for j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, where λ(v) is the Lagrange parameter of the budget constraint.
Thus, provided that vj > 0, Player 1’s best response is given by



















To solve for a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium strategy means identifying a bid function
β such that βbr = β. Even under the simplifying assumptions imposed above, the
general solution to this problem is not known. E.g., Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer
[14] assumed N = 2 and M ∈ {2, 3, 6}, with valuation vectors drawn from a uniform
distribution on a discrete simplex. While they present an analytic solution for the case
M = 2 (see the next section), they resorted to numerical methods in the cases M = 3
and M = 6.
2.3 Examples
We illustrate the set-up with the help of some examples.
Example 1 (Kovenock and Roberson [17]). Suppose that µ is the uniform distrib-
ution on the sphere segment










is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
Example 2 (Hortala-Vallve [13]; Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer [14]).
Suppose that N = M = 2. Then, for any κ ∈ [0, 1],
β∗(v) =

(1, 0) if v1 > v2
(κ, 1− κ) if v1 = v2
(0, 1) if v1 < v2
is weakly dominant, and hence, forms a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy for
any type distribution µ on R2+.
Example 3 (Akyol [3]). Suppose that N = 2, M ≥ 3, and that µ is a generalized
Gamma distribution on RM+ , with componentwise independent density


























is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
3 The case of N players
3.1 Distributional assumptions
For M ≥ 1 and p ≥ 1, we equip RM with the p-norm
‖y‖p = (|y1|
p + . . .+ |yM |p)1/p .
Within the resulting normed space, we consider the sphere segment
VM,p = {v ∈ RM+ : ‖v‖p = 1}
of vectors of p-norm one in RM+ . The set VM,p is a bordered (M−1)-dimensional manifold
embedded in RM . Figure 1 illustrates this fact for M = p = 3.
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Figure 1. The sphere segment VM,p
To specify a probability measure with support VM,p, we parameterize the manifold using
the first (M − 1) variables.
Definition 1 (Hashorva et al. [11]). The p-norm Dirichlet distribution with
parameter α > 0 is defined by the density




















In the special case p = 1, Definition 1 characterizes the classic Dirichlet distribution on
the simplex of dimension (M − 1). For general p, the distribution is derived from the
Dirichlet distribution on the simplex by taking each component of the random vector to
the power of 1/p. The distribution characterized by Definition 1 is, therefore, invariant
under arbitrary permutations of the players. Moreover, random variables following this
distribution are easy to construct numerically [11]. For αp = 1, the p-norm Dirichlet
distribution with parameter α > 0 corresponds to the uniform distribution on the sphere
segment [27].
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3.2 Statement of the main result
The main result of the present paper is the following.
Proposition 1. Suppose that M ≥ N + 1, and that each player’s vector of battlefield
valuations is drawn independently from a p-norm Dirichlet distribution with parameter
α, where p = M−1M−N and α =
1
M−1 . Then, the bid strategy defined through
β∗(v) = (v1
p, . . . , vM
p),
is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof. See the next section. 
Proposition 1 extends existing equilibrium characterizations for Colonel Blotto games
with incomplete information about valuations. In particular, Example 1 is contained as
a special case where N = 2 and M = 3. Extensions covering Examples 2 and 3 will be
presented later in the paper.
3.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that each player i ∈ {2, . . . , N} adheres to strategy β∗. Then, each type v bids
bj = v
p
j . By assumption, (M − 1)α = 1. Hence, by Lemma A.1 in the Appendix, the
marginal distribution of valuations on any battlefield is a power function distribution with
density h (v) = pαvpα−1 for v ∈ (0, 1), and cumulative distribution function H(v) = vpα.
Clearly, G(b) = H(b1/p) = bα. Therefore, F (b) = bα(N−1), with density
f(b) = α(N − 1)bα(N−1)−1.









By assumption, p = 11−α(N−1) . As before, let λ ≡ λ(v) denote the shadow cost of the













Clearly, in an optimal allocation, no resources remain unused, i.e., b1 + . . . + bM = 1.
Hence,






= α(N − 1).
Thus, it is indeed optimal for type v of Player 1 to allocate the resource as prescribed
by the symmetric equilibrium strategy b∗. Obviously, the same is true for players i ∈
{2, . . . , N}. This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
4 Extensions
This section discusses several ways to generalize the framework considered so far.
4.1 Heterogeneous budgets
In this section, we explore the case of heterogeneous budgets. This is strategically
equivalent to assuming the same biased contest technology in all battlefields. While
symmetry is lost, the set-up and equilibrium notion of Bayes-Nash equilibrium generalize
in a straightforward way. A simple observation is the following.
Proposition 2. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and M ≥ 1, and that Player 1’s budget is more
than M times as large as any other player’s budget. Then, it is a weakly dominant
strategy for Player 1 to distribute the resource evenly across all battlefields.
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Proof. Suppose that Player 1 splits her budget evenly across all battlefields j ∈
{1, . . . ,M}. Then, Player 1 wins battlefield j even if all of her opponents concentrate
their entire budget on battlefield j. 
The situation becomes more interesting if players’relative positions are less definite. As
the complete analysis of this case goes beyond the scope of the present paper, we confine
ourselves to the presentation of an example.
Example 4. Suppose that N = 2 and M ≥ 2. Suppose also that type distributions are
symmetric across battlefields and give probability zero to valuation ties across battlefields.
Suppose, finally, that the budget of Player 1 is X ∈ (M− 12 ,M ], while the budget of Player
2 is one. Then, the following is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For ε > 0 small, Player 1
places bids of (1 + ε) on (M − 1) battlefields for which she holds the highest valuations,
and the remainder X − (1 + ε)(M − 1) > 12 on the battlefield which she values least.
Player 2 bids one on the battlefield that she values most.
The equilibrium property is easy to check. Sticking to her strategy, Player 1 certainly
wins the (M − 1) battlefields for which she holds the highest valuations. Moreover,
with probably M−1M , she also wins the remaining battlefield. This is optimal even in
the borderline case X = M . Indeed, in that case, splitting the budget evenly would
win (M − 1) randomly selected battlefields with probability one, and the remaining
battlefield with probability 12 ≤
M−1
M . Thus, Player 1’s strategy is a best response.
Player 2 is unable to win two battlefields, but may win one battlefield with probability
1
M . Therefore, also Player 2’s strategy is optimal, and the strategy profile described
above is indeed a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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4.2 The case M ≤ N
Next, we discuss the case where the number of players is weakly larger than the number
of battlefields.
Proposition 3. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and that
M ≤M∗(N) ≡ 1
1− (1/N)1/(N−1)
.
Suppose also that each player’s vector of valuations is distributed symmetrically across
battlefields (but not necessarily across players), and gives probability zero to valuation
ties across battlefields. Then, bidding one on any of the highest-valuation battlefields is
a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy. Conversely, if M > M∗(N), then there
exists a distribution of types such that bidding exclusively on a highest-valuation battlefield
does not constitute a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 3 gives a sharp threshold such that bidding exclusively on a highest-valuation
battlefield constitutes a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy. Lemma A.2(i) in
the Appendix shows that, for N ≥ 2, the upper bound M∗(N) satisfies M∗(N) ≤ N ,
which justifies the heading of this section. Compared to Proposition 1, the distributional
assumptions in Proposition 3 are more flexible. Indeed, the only requirement is that each
player’s type distribution is symmetric across battlefields and gives probability zero to
valuation ties across battlefields.
Adamo and Matros ([1], Cor. 1) found that, in their model with incomplete infor-
mation about budgets, all players compete for all prizes. Proposition 3 shows that this
conclusion does not hold, in general, under incomplete information about valuations.
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The case N = M = 2 deserves some attention. In Example 2, which does not
even impose any restrictions on type distributions, we have seen that bidding one on
the highest-valuation battlefield, or dividing the budget in the case of valuations being
equal across battlefields, is a weakly dominant strategy [14, 13]. The reason is that each
player wins precisely one battlefield in expectation, regardless of the strategy chosen.
Hence, a player never “regrets”having placed a positive bid on either of two identically-
valued battlefields. However, as the following example illustrates, the property of weak
dominance does not generalize to the case of more than two players.
Example 5. Suppose that N ≥ 3 and M ≥ 2. Suppose that Player 1’s type v =
(v1, . . . , vM ) satisfies v1 > 0 and v2 ∈ ( 1N−1v1, v1). Suppose also that players j =
2, . . . , N all bid one on Battlefield 1. Then, Player 1’s expected payoff from bidding
exclusively on Battlefield 1 is 1N · (v1 + . . . + vM ), whereas the expected payoff from
bidding exclusively on Battlefield 2 is strictly higher, viz. v2 + 1N · (v3 + . . .+ vM ).
Thus, while bidding exclusively on one of the highest-valuation battlefields remains a
Bayes-Nash equilibrium under the assumption of Proposition 3, the property of weak
dominance breaks down once there are more than two players.
Next, we study what happens in “crowded”Colonel Blotto games, i.e., if the number
of players N is much larger than the number of battlefields M . We show in the Ap-
pendix that M∗(N) → ∞ as N grows above all bounds. Therefore, the assumptions of
Proposition 3 may be satisfied for any given number of battlefields M ≥ 2. We arrive at
the following observation.
Corollary 1. Let the number of battlefields M ≥ 2 be fixed. Suppose also that each
player’s vector of battlefield valuations is symmetric across battlefields, giving probability
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zero to valuation ties. Then, for any suffi ciently large N , bidding exclusively on any of
the highest-valuation battlefields is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof. See the text above. 
4.3 Alternative distributional assumptions
In this section, we extend our results to specific type distributions with support RM+ . For
the construction, we exploit the fact that the player’s problem is invariant if all battlefield
valuations are multiplied by the same positive constant. This allows the extension to
generalized Liouville distributions.
Proposition 4. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and M ≥ N + 1. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, let player
i’s distribution of types on RM+ be given by a density




































is a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof. For any given valuation vector v 6= 0, the player’s problem (1) remains un-










where v̂j = vj/ ‖v‖p. By Hashorva et al. ([11], Thm. 1), the vector v̂ = (v̂1, . . . , v̂M ) ∈
VM,p follows a p-norm Dirichlet distribution with parameter α = 1M−1 . The claim is now
immediate from Proposition 1. 
Proposition 4 extends Akyol’s ([3], Prop. 8) main equilibrium characterization to the
case of more than two players.
As explained by Hashorva et al. [11], there are numerous examples of distributions
that are consistent with the assumptions of Proposition 4, including generalized Dirichlet,
Kotz Type I through III, Pearson Type VII, and Kummer-Beta. The generalized beta
distribution assumed in Example 3, for example, is a special case of the Kotz Type I
distribution. Using Proposition 4, we may generalize the example to the multi-player
case as follows.
Example 6. Suppose that N ≥ 2 and M ≥ N +1. Suppose that each player’s battlefield
valuation v is drawn independently, across both players and battlefields, from a general-
ized gamma distribution with density pΓ(α/p)v
α−1
exp(−vp), where α and p are specified
as in the proof above. Then, the conclusion of Proposition 4 holds true.
Given that the player’s problem is homogeneous of degree zero, Proposition 4 looks like
a natural extension of Proposition 1. However, there are noteworthy implications for
expected payoffs and effi ciency. Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, the expected
payoff of a player does not depend on the type realization. Indeed, the equilibrium payoff












Thus, differences in information rents [19] are seen to net out across battlefields. Un-
der the assumptions of Proposition 4, however, equilibrium payoffs are homogeneous of
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degree one in ‖v‖p. Therefore, types with a larger (smaller) p-norm of the valuation
vector enjoy a higher (smaller) equilibrium payoff. This difference in payoffs is also re-
flected in the effi ciency analysis. Clearly, the symmetric equilibrium strategy identified
in Proposition 1 has the property that the amount of the resource deployed in any given
battlefield increases strictly in the player’s valuation of that battlefield. Thus, the iden-
tified Bayes-Nash equilibrium leads to an effi cient selection of battlefield winners, just
as in the symmetric single-unit all-pay auction with independent types. However, under
the assumption of Proposition 4, the Colonel Blotto game is not effi cient because the
equilibrium allocation maximizes v̂j rather than vj in each battlefield j.
4.4 Networks
As a final extension, we consider networks of Colonel Blotto games with N ·K players
and M ·K battlefields, where K ≥ 1 is an integer. Each player is restricted to be active
in M given battlefields, and draws a type, e.g., from the p-norm Dirichlet distribution
with parameter α, where p and α are set as in Proposition 1. For example, any trian-
gulation of a globe, say, may be understood as a network of Blotto games, where each
triangle represents a player, and each edge shared with a neighboring triangle represents
a battlefield. In this case, N = 2 and K ≥ 2. Figure 2(a) illustrates this for K = 5.
Another example is a cube where each side represents a player, and each adjacent node
represents a battlefield. In this case, N = 3, M = 4, and K = 2. See Figure 2(b) for
illustration. It is immediate to see that examples exist for any combination of N and M
for which Propositions 1 or 4 characterize a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium strategy,
and for any K ≥ 2. The equilibrium analysis extends in a straightforward way. Intu-
itively, a player does not care whether she is facing, in any two distinct battlefields, the
same opponent or two different opponents. Indeed, the player’s best response depends
16
only on the marginal distribution of bids in each battlefield.
Figure 2. Networks of Colonel Blotto games
5 Concluding remark
The methods of this paper may also be used to construct new classes of mixed-strategy
equilibria in two-player Colonel Blotto games with complete information, extending the
construction of the disc solution [8, 9, 21, 29]. Specifically, one considers a p-norm
hemisphere HM,p in R+ × RM−1, where M ≥ 3 and p = M − 1. On HM,p, one defines
a uniform distribution [27, 11]. Then, a random vector from HM,p is projected on
the hyperplane {0} × RM−1. The image of HM,p under the projection is an (M − 1)-
dimensional sphere in the p-norm. It should be noted that the image is not rotation-
invariant unless M = 3. Still, connecting all corners of the (M − 1) dimensional cube
{0}×[−1, 1]M−1 with the projection point divides the cube into 2(M−1) hyperpyramids.
As the (M − 1)-dimensional volume of any such hyperpyramid is proportional to its
height, the volumes are uniformly distributed by Lemma A.1 in the Appendix, and
may be used to determine a player’s share of the budget allocated to a battlefield.
Thus, we indeed obtain a Nash equilibrium in a two-player Colonel Blotto game with
2(M−1) battlefields and complete information. The resulting equilibrium bids perfectly
negatively correlate within pairs of battlefields, as discussed in Laslier and Picard [21].
Notwithstanding, for M ≥ 4, they differ from existing constructions.
17
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Appendix
This appendix contains auxiliary results and the proof of Proposition 3.
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the following characterization of the marginal
distribution of the p-norm Dirichlet distribution, for which we could not find a suitable
reference.
Lemma A.1 (Marginal density). The univariate marginal density of the p-norm
Dirichlet distribution with parameter α with respect to any of the components v1, . . . , vM
is given as
h(v) = pΓ(Mα)Γ(α)Γ((M−1)α) (1− v
p)(M−1)α−1 vpα−1,
where v ∈ (0, 1). In particular, if (M−1)α = 1, then the univariate marginal is a power
function distribution on [0, 1].
Proof. We follow the steps of the proof of Song and Gupta ([27], Thm. 2.1). Fix
































Using the substitution ṽM−1 = vM−1/AM−1, it follows that
AM−1∫
0































































































which proves the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that all opponents of Player 1 adhere to the can-
didate equilibrium strategy, i.e., bid the entire budget on one of the highest-valuation
battlefields. Suppose first that Player 1 likewise follows the candidate equilibrium strat-
egy. Then, Player 1 wins her selected battlefield with probability 1n+1 if precisely n other
19
players bid on it, where n ∈ {0, . . . , N−1}. Moreover, Player 1 wins any other battlefield
with probability 1N if no other player bids on it. Denote by v(j) Player 1’s j-th highest











































































Suppose next that Player 1 deviates. For the winning probability of a bid, it matters
only if the bid is zero, one, or strictly between zero and one. Moreover, winning prob-
abilities are weakly increasing in the bid. Therefore, it suffi ces to check the deviation
that distributes the budget evenly over all M battlefields. In that case, Player 1 wins a
battlefield j if and only if no other player bids on that battlefield. Hence, the resulting























































, which in turn is equivalent to M ≤ M∗(N).
This proves the proposition. 
The following lemma collects properties of the thresholdM∗(N) defined in the statement
of Proposition 3.
Lemma A.2 (Properties of M∗(N)).
(i) N ≥ 2 implies M∗(N) ≤ N .
(ii) limN→∞M∗(N) =∞.
Proof. (i) A straightforward calculation shows that M∗(N) ≤ N is equivalent to(
1− 1N
)N−1 ≥ 1N , which in turn follows from Bernoulli’s inequality. (ii) It suffi ces
to recall that limN→∞
N
√
N = 1. 
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